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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
                            ----------  
  
GARTH, Circuit Judge:  
 
 The instant appeal requires us to decide whether the plaintiff-clients, whose 
attorneys purchased photocopies of the clients' hospital records for the purpose of 
prosecuting their clients' personal injury and medical malpractice claims, have standing 
to bring an antitrust action against the sellers of the photocopies.  We hold that such 
clients lack standing to bring a treble-damages claim because they are not "direct 
purchasers," as required by Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). However, 
5 
we also hold that these clients are not barred from seeking injunctive relief under 
section 16 of the Clayton Act. 
 
I. 
 Plaintiffs Mary Ruth McCarthy,0 Guy Colville, Edward Ormsby, Carmen Tomasetti0 and 
Joseph Hoffman filed a three-count complaint, on January 19, 1993, against five hospitals 
(the "Hospital defendants")0 and five copy-service companies (the "Copy Service 
defendants").0  The complaint asserted violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1 and 2 (count I);0 violations of the Racketeering, Influence, and Corrupt Organiza
tions Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1433 and 1962 (count II); and violations of the civil 
rights laws, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (count III).  The complaint and amended complaint sought 
injunctive relief, money damages, class certification and attorneys' fees. In essence, 
plaintiffs allege that the Hospital Defendants and the Copy Service Defendants conspired 
                     
0McCarthy died subsequent to the institution of this litigation.  A personal 
representative has been named for her but has not been formally substituted on the record, 
as of the date of this appeal. 
0Tomasetti died after commencing this action.  No personal representative has been named 
as of the date of this appeal. 
0The Hospital Defendants are Mercy Health Corporation of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 
Misericordia Hospital Division ("Misericordia"); Methodist Hospital ("Methodist"); the 
Graduate Hospital ("Graduate"); Hahnemann University Hospital ("Hahnemann"); and the Lower 
Bucks Hospital ("Lower Bucks"). They are all hospital corporations that operate hospitals 
in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 
0The Copy Service Defendants are Recordex Services, Inc. ("Recordex"), CopyRight, Inc. 
("CopyRight"), Smart Corporation ("Smart"), Medfax, Inc. ("MedFax"), and Hospital 
Correspondence, Copiers ("HCC").  They are all corporations doing business in the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, who have entered into contracts with one of the Hospital 
Defendants to perform copying services in response to requests for copies of hospital 
records. 
0Count I specifically alleges that the defendants engaged in a "contract combination or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade effecting [sic] interstate commerce"; and that "the 
defendants possess a monopoly in the relevant market for the performance of copying 
services of hospital patient records, and have willfully maintained that power in order to 
illegally extract unlawful prices for the performance of said copy services."  Complaint 
at ¶ 52. 
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to charge excessive prices for photocopies of medical records requested by patients or 
former patients. 
 Each of the named plaintiffs, at some time within four years before filing the 
instant action, were patients at hospitals owned by the Hospital Defendants.  Each 
plaintiff had retained either Matty & Ferroni ("M&F"), a New Jersey law firm, or Fell & 
Spalding ("F&S), a Philadelphia firm, to file a personal injury or medical malpractice 
claim on his or her behalf.  In each case, after the particular plaintiff had signed a 
medical consent form authorizing the appropriate hospital to release his or her medical 
records, the plaintiff's attorney requested photocopies of the client's hospital records.  
The copy service company, in each case, billed the attorney directly.0 
 Each of the five plaintiffs had entered into a contingent-fee agreement with either 
M&F or F&S.  With the exception of McCarthy, none of the plaintiffs were obligated under 
the relevant retainer agreement to reimburse the law firm for costs, including the 
photocopying expenses at issue, unless a monetary recovery in favor of the particular 
client was obtained.0 McCarthy's agreement with F&S, on the other hand, provided that 
                     
0Tomasetti retained M&F, which requested copies of patient records from Hahnemann; 
Recordex provided the photocopying services and charged M&F $44.40.  Hoffman retained M&F, 
which requested copies of records from Lower Bucks; MedFax performed the photocopying and 
charged M&F $19.22.  Both Tomasetti and Hoffman settled their cases and reimbursed M&F out 
of their settlement proceeds for the photocopying costs. 
 Colville retained M&F, which requested copies from Methodist; Smart, which performed 
the photocopying, charged M&F $25.49.  Ormsby also retained M&F, which requested copies 
from Graduate; HCC photocopied the records, charging M&F $38.40.  At the time this a
was filed, neither Colville nor Ormsby had reached a settlement, and neither had 
reimbursed M&F for the copying expenses incurred.  Ormsby has apparently discontinued his 
personal injury claim.  App. at 536. 
 McCarthy retained F&S, which requested copies of her medical records from 
Misericordia.  CopyRight, which was responsible for providing copying services related to 
requests for Misericordia patient records, billed F&S $540.  F&S refused to pay the bill 
but eventually obtained the copies from opposing counsel.  App. at 517-20, 525. 
0The four plaintiffs other than McCarthy entered into contingent fee agreements with M&F.  
Under these agreements, the law firm would receive its fee (33-1/3% for Tomasetti and 40% 
for each of the other three plaintiffs) only if it successfully litigated or settled the 
case.  Under Colville's contract, M&F would be entitled to 40% of the recovery plus 
reimbursement of any costs.  The other three contracts only awarded M&F a percentage of 
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"[t]he absence of a recovery shall not relieve [McCarthy] from the obligation of paying 
court costs and other proper litigation and investigative costs."0  App. 498.  However, 
Stephen R. Bolden, a partner at F&S, admitted in an affidavit that despite the contractual 
language, in actual practice, the firm never sought reimbursement for advanced costs where 
representation of the client did not lead to a recovery: 
Although under the express language in this Contingent Fee Agreement, Fell & 
Spalding is contractually entitled to seek reimbursement from a client even 
where a representation of that client has not led to the recovery of funds; as a 
matter of actual practice, where Fell & Spalding has been unsuccessful in 
obtaining a recovery of funds by way of settlement or otherwise . . . Fell & 
Spalding has not sought reimbursement for the costs incurred in copying a 
client's hospital records . . . . 
 
App. 526.0 
 Each of the Hospital Defendants had entered into a contract with one of the Copy 
Service Defendants, granting the Copy Service Defendant the exclusive right to photocopy 
hospital records requested by patients or other members of the public entitled to such 
records.  Under the contract, the copy-service company agreed to photocopy any medical 
                                                                                          
the recovery (i.e. M&F would have to cover its costs out of its percentage share of the 
settlement or award). 
 None of the fee agreements entitled M&F to reimbursement of costs if the client 
failed to recover.  Colville's contract provided:  "If there is no recovery there will be 
no charge for services rendered."  App. 414.  Likewise, Hoffman's agreement stated:  "If 
no monies are recovered there will be no fee for services rendered."  App. 433.  Ormsby's 
agreement similarly read:  "If there is no recovery, there are no charges for any fees
App. 455.  Finally, Tomasetti's contingent fee agreement provided:  "If no monies are 
recovered attorney to have no claim for services rendered. -- Attorney to advance all 
costs necessary, & to be reimbursed at settlement."  App. 470. 
0If McCarthy prevailed, F&S would receive a 1/3 contingent fee (calculated based on the 
amount of the award or settlement before deducting expenses) plus litigation expenses.
0Richard C. Ferroni, a partner at M&F, similarly stated in an affidavit that 
 
[h]e had not, nor has his firm, ever sought reimbursement for costs (including 
costs of obtaining copies of a client's hospital records) from a client where 
there has not been a recovery in the action in which he or his firm has 
represented the client and the Contingent Fee Agreement does not address costs, 
although clients are advised they are responsible for costs regardless of 
outcome. 
 
App. 536. 
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records requested by patients or other requestors.  The sole remuneration received by the 
Copy Service Defendants derived from the copying charges paid by the requestors.  App. 
685, 692, 694, 698, 701. 
 Patients or their attorneys were charged $1 per page for copies of medical records.  
In addition, they also typically paid a retrieval fee, which was remitted to the hospital; 
an "administrative" or "basic" fee (i.e. a flat fee unrelated to the number of copies), 
which was retained by the copy-service company; and postage and handling fees. 
 Certain "favored" requestors were charged a reduced rate0 or no fee at all.0  The 
Hospital Defendants set the schedule of charges, designating the requestors who would or 
would not be charged.  Typically, sixty percent or more of the requests for hospital 
records were nonbillable. 
 Plaintiffs claim that the practice of subsidizing certain requestors while charging 
patients or their agents an inflated fee violated a Pennsylvania regulation, which 
provides in relevant part: 
Patients or patient designees shall be given access to or a copy of their 
medical records, or both . . . . Upon the death of a patient, the hospital shall 
provide, upon request, to the executor of the decedent's estate or, in the 
absence of an executor, the next of kin responsible for the disposition of the 
remains, access to all medical records of the deceased patient.  The patient or 
the patient's next of kin may be charged for the cost of reproducing the copies; 
however, the charges shall be reasonably related to the cost of making the copy
 
28 Pa. Code § 115.29 (emphasis added). 
 After plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, the defendants moved to dismiss pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The district court, by order dated August 5, 
1993, denied defendants' motion to dismiss counts I (antitrust) and II (RICO) but granted 
the motion to dismiss count III (civil rights). 
                     
0For example, Medicare copy requests were billed at seven cents per page; and the 
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board paid a ten dollar flat fee per request regardless of 
the number of pages actually copied. 
0For example, other hospitals, physician's offices, Blue Cross and Blue Shield, the 
Veteran's Administration and social service agencies received copies for free.  The 
military and certain HMOs also received free copies.   
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 Subsequently, on April 4, 1994, plaintiffs moved to certify the case as a class 
action.  On November 18, 1994, in a Memorandum and Order, the district court denied 
plaintiffs' motion for class certification. 
 On April 1, 1994, defendant Hahnemann filed a motion for partial summary judgment on 
count I (the antitrust claim), which was eventually joined by all of the defendants except 
Smart.  The district court denied the motion for partial summary judgment in an order 
dated May 5, 1994. 
 Subsequently, Hahnemann moved for reconsideration.  On July 8, 1994, the district 
court granted Hahnemann's motion for reconsideration and granted summary judgment on count 
I in favor of all defendants, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they 
were not "direct purchasers" of the hospital records, within the meaning of Illinois Brick 
Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
 On December 12, 1994, all of the defendants joined in a motion for summary judgment 
on the remaining RICO claim, on the theory that antitrust standing principles applied 
equally in the RICO context.  On December 29, 1994, the district court granted summary 
judgment to all defendants on count II, thus disposing of all three counts of the 
complaint.  Plaintiffs timely filed the instant appeal. 
 
II. 
 The district court had jurisdiction over plaintiffs' antitrust and RICO claims under 
15 U.S.C. § 15; 18 U.S.C. § 1964; and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have appellate jurisdiction 
over the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  
 The issue of antitrust standing is a legal issue, over which we exercise plenary 
review.  In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1164 (3d Cir. 
1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 625, 652, and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 921 (1994).  We 
also exercise plenary review of a district court's grant of summary judgment, applying the 
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same standards applied by the district court.  Rosen v. Bezner, 996 F.2d 1527, 1530 (3d 
Cir. 1993); Koshatka v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 762 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 1985).
 Summary judgment is proper only where "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine dispute exists as 
to any material fact.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  
Moreover, any inferences to be drawn must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment.  Id. at 247; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 
 
III. 
A. 
 Almost twenty years ago, the Supreme Court articulated the so-called "direct 
purchaser" rule, an antitrust standing doctrine that barred downstream indirect purchasers 
from bringing an antitrust claim.  See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 744 
(1977).  Recognizing that allowing an indirect purchaser to assert an antitrust claim for 
the portion of an overcharge "passed on" to the indirect purchaser would create an 
intractable problem of tracing and apportioning damages between different purchasers in 
the chain of distribution, the Court chose to avoid this morass by enunciating a bright
line rule that only the purchaser immediately downstream from the alleged monopolist may 
bring an antitrust action.  Id. 
 Almost a decade before Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court laid the foundation for the 
"direct purchaser" standing requirement in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery 
Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968), which rejected a "pass-on" defense proffered by an antitrust 
defendant who claimed that the plaintiff was not entitled to treble damages for costs 
"passed on" to its customers.  Id. at 487-89.  In Hanover Shoe, the plaintiff shoe 
manufacturer, Hanover Shoe, Inc., brought suit under section 4 of the Clayton Act again
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United Shoe Machinery Corp. (USMC), a manufacturer and distributor of shoe machinery, 
alleging that USMC had monopolized the shoe machinery industry by refusing to sell its 
equipment and requiring users to lease the equipment instead.  Id. at 486-87.  USMC argued 
that Hanover Shoe had been able to recoup its losses by charging its customers more for 
the shoes and thus did not suffer any cognizable injury because it had passed on the 
allegedly illegal overcharge to its customers. Id. at 487-88. 
 The Court rejected USMC's pass-on theory, explaining that entertaining such a defense 
would raise difficult proof issues as to the amount of the overcharge passed on and 
whether, absent the overcharge, Hanover Shoe could have raised its prices.  Id. at 489
The Court also expressed concern that downstream buyers would have only "a tiny stake in a 
lawsuit" and thus little incentive to prosecute a private antitrust claim.  Id. at 494. 
The Court reasoned that allowing a pass-on defense would diminish private antitrust 
enforcement and thereby increase the likelihood that violators of antitrust laws would 
escape liability.  Id.   
 In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court addressed the corollary to the problem they 
faced in Hanover Shoe:  offensive use of the pass-on theory by indirect purchasers to 
recover treble damages for injuries "passed on" to them by intermediaries in the 
distribution chain.  Illinois Brick involved a suit brought by the State of Illinois and 
700 local governmental entities against a group of concrete block manufacturers, who had 
allegedly engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy.  431 U.S. at 726-27.  The State and the 
local municipalities had hired general contractors for several large construction projects 
in the Chicago area.  Id. at 726.  The general contractors, in turn, had subcontracted the 
masonry work to certain masonry contractors who had purchased the allegedly overpriced 
blocks from the conspirators.   Id.  The State of Illinois and the local governmental 
entities were thus indirect purchasers of concrete block, two levels down the distribution 
chain from the manufacturers.  Id. 
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 Illinois and the other governmental entities claimed that part or all of the 
overcharge had been passed on by the subcontractors and general contractors.  Id. at 727.
As a result, according to the plaintiffs, they had overpaid for the concrete block by more 
than three million dollars.  Id.  The Court dismissed the claim, holding that indirect 
purchasers may not sue for antitrust damages. Id. at 736. 
 The Court in Illinois Brick explained that the outcome was dictated by Hanover Shoe
and that principles of judicial consistency compelled the Court to prohibit the offensive 
use of a pass-on theory where it had disallowed the defensive use of the pass-on doctrine 
in a similar factual situation.  Id. at 730. The Court further explicated that permitting 
the latter while disallowing the former would create a risk of multiple liability: "A 
one-sided application of Hanover Shoe substantially increases the possibility of 
inconsistent adjudications--and therefore of unwarranted multiple liability for the 
defendant--by presuming that one plaintiff (the direct purchaser) is entitled to full 
recovery while preventing the defendant from using that presumption against the other 
plaintiff . . . ."  Id. 
 The State posited that the danger of duplicative recovery could be avoided by 
apportioning the damages attributable to the concrete-block manufacturers' wrongful 
conduct.  The Court, however, rejected the State's argument that indirect purchasers 
should be allowed to recover the fraction of the overcharge "passed on" to them, 
explaining: 
 Permitting the use of pass-on theories . . . essentially would transform 
treble-damages actions into massive efforts to apportion the recovery among all 
potential plaintiffs that would have absorbed part of the overcharge--from 
direct purchasers to middlemen to ultimate consumers.  However appealing this 
attempt to allocate the overcharge might seem in theory, it would add whole new 
dimensions of complexity to treble-damages suits and seriously undermine their 
effectiveness. 
 
Id. at 737. 
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 Subsequently, in Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990), the Court 
reaffirmed its commitment to the "direct purchaser" rule, refusing to carve out an 
exception to Illinois Brick for situations where the full cost of the product (and hence 
one hundred percent of any overcharge) had been passed on to the indirect purchaser.  
at 216.  In Utilicorp, the States of Kansas and Missouri, acting as parens patriae, 
brought an antitrust action on behalf of their residents, claiming that a pipeline company 
and five gas producers had conspired to inflate the price of the natural gas that they 
supplied to public utilities.  Id. at 204.  These utilities, according the States, had 
passed on the full amount of the overcharge to their residential and commercial customers.  
Id.   
 Kansas and Missouri argued that the concerns voiced in Illinois Brick, namely the 
difficulties of apportionment, the risk of multiple recovery and the diminution of 
incentives for private antitrust enforcement, were absent because regulated public 
utilities pass on one hundred percent of their costs to consumers, who are the ones that 
actually suffer antitrust injury.  The Court forcefully rejected that argument, opining 
that "[a]lthough the rationales of Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick may not apply with 
equal force in all instances, we find it inconsistent with precedent and imprudent in any 
event to create an exception for regulated public utilities."  Id. at 208. 
 We have applied Illinois Brick's antitrust standing principle on several occasions.  
For example, in Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573 (3d 
Cir. 1979), we relied on Illinois Brick in holding that indirect purchasers of consumer 
bags could not maintain a treble-damages suit against the manufacturers of such bags.  
at 575.  In Mid-West Paper, the defendants manufactured so-called consumer bags--single or 
multilayered paper bags used for packaging pet foods, coffee, cookies, chemicals and the 
like.  Id.  The plaintiff-grocery stores purchased either empty consumer bags (which they 
used to package their own products) from middlemen and wholesalers or products that were 
pre-packaged in consumer bags for resale to their customers. Id. at 575-76.  After 
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reviewing the teachings of Illinois Brick, we determined that the "direct purchaser" rule 
barred the treble-damages claims of all of the plaintiffs (except Mid-West Paper Products 
Company, which had purchased consumer bags directly from a subsidiary of one of the 
defendants).  Id. at 575. 
 Similarly, in Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984), non-factory-authorized dealers, who had purchased 
electrical generators from authorized dealers for resale in foreign markets, alleged that 
Caterpillar, the manufacturer of these electrical generators, had illegally imposed a 
penalty on its dealers to prevent or discourage the dealers from selling Caterpillar 
products to independent marketers.  Id. at 960.  The district court held that the 
plaintiffs had standing under Illinois Brick because the nonfactory-authorized dealers 
were the "direct target[s] of an unlawful conspiracy."  Id. at 962.  We reversed, holdin
that an indirect purchaser, even if a "direct target" of an antitrust conspiracy, lacked 
standing under Illinois Brick. Id. at 966. 
 Likewise, in Link v. Mercedes-Benz, Inc., 788 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1986), Mercedes 
repair customers claimed that Mercedes dealers, who were required to purchase parts 
exclusively from Mercedes at artificially inflated prices, had passed on those costs to 
retail customers.  Id. at 928-30.  Citing Illinois Brick, we held that retail customers 
were indirect purchasers and therefore lacked antitrust standing.  Id. at 930.   
 Most recently, in Gulfstream III Associates, Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.
F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1993), we held that only the direct purchaser of an aircraft, and not a 
downstream buyer or assignee, had standing to pursue an antitrust claim.  Id. at 439.  We 
emphasized that "any exception to the direct purchaser rule would be inappropriate in this 
case for the same reasons that the Supreme Court held an exception would be inappropriate 
in Utilicorp."  Id. 
 
B. 
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 Plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court has receded from Illinois Brick's "direct 
purchaser" rule.  Specifically, plaintiffs contend that the "direct purchaser" requirement 
has been displaced by the multi-factor approach to antitrust standing outlined in 
Associated General Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 
(1983) [hereinafter "AGC"]. 
 In AGC, the plaintiff-unions, representing California construction workers, sued an 
association of employers with whom the unions had entered into collective bargaining 
agreements. Id. at 522-24.  The complaint alleged that the association and its members had 
coerced certain landowners and other contractors to hire non-union labor.  Id. 
 In determining whether the plaintiff-unions had standing to sue under section 4 of 
the Clayton Act, the AGC Court employed a five-part analytical framework, which 
encompassed the following considerations:  (1) the causal connection between the antitrust 
violation and the harm to the plaintiff (including whether the defendant intended to cause 
that harm), id. at 537; (2) whether the "nature" of the plaintiff's alleged injury is "of 
the type that the antitrust laws were intended to forestall," id. at 538; (3) the 
directness or indirectness of the asserted injury, id. at 541; (4) the existence of more 
direct victims of the alleged injury (i.e. whether the plaintiff is the party most likely 
to seek redress of the antitrust violation), id. at 542; and (5) the potential for 
duplicative recovery or complex apportionment of damages, id. at 543-44.  The AGC five
factor framework was an attempt by the Court to synthesize and clarify the confusing 
collection of the then-extant antitrust-standing rules.0 
                     
0Prior to AGC, the courts of appeals applied a variety of different tests to determine 
standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act:  (1) the "direct injury" test, see Chrysler 
Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1233 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981); 
Loeb v. Eastman Kodak, 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910); (2) the "zone of interests" test, 
see Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1151-1152 (6th Cir. 1975); and (3) the 
"target area" test, see Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 546-47 (5th 
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981); Calderone Enters. Corp. v. United Artists 
Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 
(1972).  Recognizing that these alternative formulations for assessing antitrust standing 
often led to contradictory and inconsistent results, the Supreme Court in AGC attempted to 
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 Contrary to plaintiffs' intimation, however, the AGC Court neither overruled Illinois 
Brick nor limited its application. Indeed, the AGC Court cited Illinois Brick with 
approval.  See id. at 544-45.  Moreover, factors four and five in the AGC framework echo 
Illinois Brick's concerns.  In our view, AGC incorporates, rather than repudiates, the 
principles of Illinois Brick.0 
 Plaintiffs assert, however, that the absolute bar of the "direct purchaser" rule has 
been supplanted by AGC's balancing approach.  In support of this contention, plaintiffs 
cite to certain passages from our opinion in In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust 
Litigation, 998 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 625, 652, and cert. 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 921 (1994), wherein we adumbrated that "indirect purchaser status is 
[not necessarily] the death knell of [an antitrust] claim . . . ."  Id. at 1168.  In 
Lake Erie, several steel companies, dock companies and trucking companies filed civil 
actions in federal district court, alleging that the defendant railroad companies serving 
the lower Lake Erie industrial region had conspired to monopolize the transportation and 
handling of iron ore in the region.  Id. at 1151, 1152.   
                                                                                          
articulate a unified set of factors that could be applied generally in determining 
antitrust standing. 
0Of course, AGC and Illinois Brick address two analytically distinct aspects of antitrust 
standing.  See Merican, 713 F.2d at 963-65 (noting that "the Supreme Court has recognized 
two types of limitations on the availability of the section 4 remedy which the courts must 
consider when examining whether a treble damage action may be maintained").  The AGC
was concerned primarily with the issue of whether a particular plaintiff's injury was too 
remote from an antitrust injury to warrant providing that plaintiff a section 4 remedy.  
Id. at 964.  This inquiry, akin to the determination of "proximate cause" in the 
negligence context, is subtle and resists the use of hard-and-fast "black letter" rules.  
See id.   
 In contrast, Illinois Brick dealt with the issue of whether a plaintiff who is able 
to trace an injury to an antitrust violation falls "within the group of 'private attorneys 
general' that Congress created to enforce the antitrust laws under section 4."  Id.
963.  Illinois Brick focuses exclusively on the risk of duplicative recovery and the 
potential for overly-complex damages and apportionment calculations.  Id. at 963-64.  
Because there would always be a risk of duplicative recovery, as well as the potential for 
complex apportionment computations, if indirect purchasers were allowed to bring antitrust 
claims, the "direct purchaser" rule, unlike the AGC standard, is a bright-line rule.
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 In a bifurcated trial, the liability jury found against Bessemer and Lake Erie 
Railroad Company (BL&E), the sole remaining defendant,0 and in favor of all plaintiffs but 
one; and the damages jury awarded all but one claim for damages.  Id. at 1151.  On appeal, 
we applied AGC and affirmed the district court's denial of BL&E's motion to dismiss for 
lack of standing and the district court's denial of BL&E's motion for judgment n.o.v.  
 Plaintiffs here contend that Lower Lake Erie requires that we set aside the district 
court's grant of summary judgment and remand for a determination of standing pursuant to 
the AGC factors.  We disagree. 
 Lower Lake Erie is fully distinguishable.  In Lower Lake Erie, we found that the 
plaintiffs' claims did not involve "the particular kind of double recovery Illinois Brick
sought to prevent."  Id. at 1169. 
 By contrast, all of the policy concerns expressed in Illinois Brick are implicated in 
the present case.  First, there is considerable risk that the Hospital defendants and Copy 
Service defendants would be exposed to multiple liability. Although plaintiffs' attorneys 
here have chosen not to sue the defendants directly, it is probable that lawyers who 
themselves purchase photocopies of their clients' hospital records would bring treble
damage claims against the Hospital defendants and the Copy Service defendants in the 
future.  Indeed, both the district court and this court inquired as to why the instant 
complaint had not been amended to substitute the attorneys as plaintiffs.  No satisfactory 
answer was given.  Hence, if we were to deny the defendants the protection of the "direct 
purchaser" rule, they could potentially be held liable to both the clients and the 
attorneys representing the clients. 
 Furthermore, this lawsuit involves apportionment problems perhaps more complex than 
those implicated in Illinois Brick. Because the costs of the photocopies are only passed 
on to the client, if the costs are passed on at all, on a contingent basis, the district 
                     
0The other defendants all settled before trial. 
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court would be faced with complex statistical calculations as to the percentage of 
photocopying costs borne by the attorneys as compared to the costs borne by their clients. 
In addition, the district court would have to ascertain the degree to which contingent 
fees charged to successful plaintiffs includes a recoupment of photocopying costs not 
charged to losing plaintiffs. 
 Under these circumstances, plaintiffs cannot escape the absolute bar of the "direct 
purchaser" rule.  In order to survive summary judgment, plaintiffs must establish that the 
clients, and not their attorneys, are the direct purchasers of the hospital-record 
photocopies.  On this record, no such proof exists. 
 
C. 
 Plaintiffs argue that they, and not their lawyers, are the direct purchasers of the 
hospital record photocopies.0 Plaintiffs contend that their attorneys merely acted as 
their agents in purchasing the photocopies.  Citing In re Toilet Seat Antitrust 
Litigation, 1977-2 Trade Cases ¶ 61,601 (E.D. Mich. 1977), plaintiffs posit that purchases 
made by an agent on behalf of the agent's principal do not come within the scope of the 
"direct purchaser" rule. 
                     
0Plaintiffs first contend that their attorneys cannot be considered part of the chain of 
distribution because they do not make a profit from, or charge separately for, the 
photocopies. We are not persuaded for at least two reasons.  First, in order for a 
consumer to be considered an indirect purchaser of an item, it is not necessary that the 
consumer incur a separate charge for that item; it is only necessary that the consumer 
have purchased the item through a middleman.  For example, a homeowner who hires a 
housepainter who charges by the hour and does not invoice the homeowner separately for the 
cost of materials cannot be considered the "direct purchaser" of the paint used by the 
housepainter. 
 Second, attorneys do profit, albeit indirectly, from their purchase of their clients' 
hospital record photocopies.  That is, they earn a contingent fee at the end of a 
successful action. Moreover, even if the attorneys failed to profit (or even if they 
suffered a loss) on the transaction, this fact does not transform their clients into 
direct purchasers.  For example, in the previous hypothetical, the homeowner would still 
be considered an indirect purchaser even if the housepainter had charged a fee 
insufficient to recoup the costs of the paint job or if the housepainter had charged no 
fee at all. 
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 We are unpersuaded by plaintiffs' argument and find In re Toilet Seat Antitrust 
Litigation, the single case relied upon by the plaintiffs in support of their agency 
theory, to be inapposite.  That case involved an alleged conspiracy by toilet seat 
manufacturers to fix the price of wood-flour toilet seats. See In re Toilet Seat Antitrust 
Litig., 387 F. Supp. 1342, 1343 (J.P.M.L. 1975).  One of the plaintiffs, Harvey Lumber 
Company, purchased toilet seats through a purchasing agent, Biddle Purchasing Company, 
which actually placed the order for the toilet seats at a price approved by Harvey.  
Biddle received a flat monthly fee, unrelated to the quantity of toilets ordered, and kept 
no inventory.  In re Toilet Seat Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2 Trade Cases ¶ 61,601, at 
72,496.  The district court concluded that under these limited circumstances, Harvey was a 
direct purchaser of the toilet seats and had standing to bring an antitrust claim.0
at 72,496-97. 
 In the present case, in contrast, none of the plaintiffs retained their lawyers to 
act as mere purchasing agents whose sole objective and function was to buy photocopies for 
the clients.  Rather, each client hired his or her attorney to file a lawsuit on his or 
her behalf and to protect the client's legal interests.  Moreover, a fair reading of the 
record reveals that the lawyers purchased the photocopies for their own use in 
representing their clients.  The attorneys, and not the clients, were undeniably the 
direct purchasers of the photocopies. 
 Furthermore, the fact that the costs of the photocopies were passed on to the client 
on a dollar for dollar basis (at least where the attorney obtained a recovery on behalf 
                     
0The district court relied on the dictum in footnote 16 of Illinois Brick, which stated:  
"Another situation in which market forces have been superseded and the pass-on defense 
might be permitted is where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer."
Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 736 n.16 (citing Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 
648 (1969) and In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 197, 199 (9th Cir. 1973), 
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974)).  Because Harvey "controlled" Biddle's actions 
regarding purchases made on Harvey's behalf, the district court "view[ed] the relationship 
between Harvey and Biddle as falling within the above exception." In re Toilet Seat 
Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2 Trade Cases ¶ 61,601, at 72,497. 
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the client) is not dispositive.0  Indeed, the subcontractors in Illinois Brick and the 
utility companies in Utilicorp passed on their costs to the plaintiffs in those respective 
cases; yet the Supreme Court deemed this fact insufficient to confer standing to the 
indirect-purchaser plaintiffs in those cases. 
 Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish these precedents by characterizing the middlemen in 
those cases as "independent contractors."  Plaintiffs take the position that the attorneys 
in the present case, in contrast, are agents and not independent contractors. 
 It is, of course, beyond cavil that the attorney-client relationship is an agent
principal relationship.  However, attorneys are also independent contractors as well as 
agents. See Restatement (2d) Agency § 14N (1958) ("One who contracts to act on behalf of 
another and subject to the other's control except with respect to his physical conduct is 
an agent and also an independent contractor."); id. § 14N comment a ("[M]ost of the 
persons known as agents, that is, brokers, factors, attorneys, collection agencies, and 
selling agencies are independent contractors . . . .") (emphasis added); 41 Am. Jur. 2d 
Independent Contractors § 4 (1995) ("[F]or example, attorneys at law . . . and other 
similar persons . . . are agents, although as to their physical activities they are 
independent contractors . . . .") (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Minds Coal 
Mining Corp., 60 A.2d 14, 20 (Pa. 1948) (adopting Restatement definitions of independent 
contractor). 
 An agent may be either an independent contractor or a servant (or employee in modern 
day parlance).  See Restatement (2d) Agency § 2 comment b (1958) ("An agent who is not a 
servant is, therefore, an independent contractor when he contracts to act on account of 
the principal.").  Therefore, the relevant inquiry here is not whether a principal-
                     
0Plaintiffs are no more direct purchasers of the hospital record photocopies at issue here 
than a passenger in a taxicab would be considered a direct purchaser of the gasoline used 
by the taxicab to carry the passenger to his destination.  Moreover, even if a separate
charge for gasoline were assessed, the taxi passenger still could not be considered a 
direct purchaser in any sense. 
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relationship exists between clients and their attorneys, but whether attorneys are 
independent contractors or mere employees.  Although there are a number of factors 
relevant to this inquiry, see Restatement (2d) of Agency § 220 (1958), the most important 
factor is the degree of control exercised by the principal: 
The legal distinction between an employee and an independent contractor is so 
well established as to require little, if any, discussion.  The characteristics 
of the former relationship is that the master not only controls the result of 
the work but has the right to direct the way in which it shall be done, whereas 
the characteristic of the latter is that the person engaged in the work has the 
exclusive control of the manner of performing it, being responsible only for the 
result. 
 
Feller v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 70 A.2d 299, 300 (1950).  See also Moon Area Sch. Dist. 
v. Garzony, 560 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Pa. 1989); Hammermill Paper Co. v. Rust Eng'g Co., 243 
A.2d 389, 392 (Pa. 1968). 
 It is clear that attorneys exercise "exclusive control of the manner of performing 
[their legal work], being responsible [to the client] only for the result."  Feller
A.2d at 300. 
 Furthermore, plaintiffs here are not even directly liable for the cost of the 
photocopies.  Except for McCarthy, plaintiffs are liable only if their attorneys succeed 
in achieving a recovery on their behalf.  Indeed, three of the contingent-fee agreements 
do not impose a separate charge for litigation costs; rather, the attorneys are reimbursed 
out of their percentage share of the settlement or award.   
 In McCarthy's case, although the retainer agreement does indicate that she is 
responsible for costs irrespective of the outcome, her attorney acknowledged that in 
actual practice, his law firm never charged clients unless the firm obtained a recovery.  
Furthermore, McCarthy faces another insurmountable obstacle:  her attorney never paid
photocopying charges but rather obtained the needed copies from opposing counsel. 
Therefore, McCarthy (and indeed, even her attorney) cannot show any injury -- much less 
antitrust injury. 
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 Based on these undisputed facts, we must conclude that the clients are not direct 
purchasers.0  And unless an exception to the "direct purchaser" principle applies here, 
the plaintiffs have no standing to assert their antitrust claim under count I. 
 
D. 
 Plaintiffs argue, in the alternative, that Illinois Brick does not apply here because 
they fall within the "co-conspirator" exception to the direct purchaser rule.  Citing to 
Link, 788 F.2d at 918, and In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Litigation, 867 F. Supp. 
1338 (N.D. Ill. 1994), plaintiffs advance the proposition that indirect buyers have 
standing to bring an antitrust claim against defendants who are co-conspirators in a 
vertical antitrust conspiracy.  To the extent that these cases recognize a co-conspirator 
exception, however, we hold that plaintiffs have failed to establish the applicability of 
such an exception to the facts at hand. 
 Preliminarily, we reject plaintiffs' reading of Link as establishing an exception to 
Illinois Brick where the middlemen, from whom the plaintiffs made purchases, participated 
                     
0The attorneys are the real parties in interest.  Indeed, as noted previously, the 
district court offered the plaintiffs' attorneys an opportunity to substitute themselves 
as the plaintiffs of record.  Although the defendants did not object to the district 
court's proposal, the attorneys for the plaintiffs declined the court's offer, choosing 
instead to appeal the district court's adverse ruling as to standing. 
 
 We acknowledge that generally an attorney is to be considered the agent of the 
client, and as such, would not be held personally liable for expenditures made for a 
disclosed principal.  See Messenger Publishing Co. v. Walkinshaw, 157 A. 18 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1931).  However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to address this subject and 
there is a wealth of authority that an attorney ordering goods or services in connection 
with litigation, as is the case here, ordinarily be treated as a principal and hence would 
be liable for such expenses.  
 
 Even the lower courts in Pennsylvania, whose decisions are not binding on us, have 
had difficulty with this issue.  See Pessano v. Eyre, 13 Pa. Super. 157 (1900).  But 
neither the cases revealed by the parties' research nor those revealed by our own research 
have discussed this issue in the context of a federal antitrust action, such as we have 
here.  In none of those cases was the Illinois Brick direct purchaser rule at issue.  We 
are satisfied that in the instant antitrust context, the attorney-appellants do not have 
standing to prosecute this action. 
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in a vertical antitrust conspiracy.  To the contrary, in Link, we expressly refused to 
adopt such an exception where the alleged co-conspirators immediately upstream were not 
also joined as codefendants: 
Alternatively, appellants argue that this court should carve out a narrow 
exception to Illinois Brick in vertical conspiracies where the intervening 
parties in the distribution process are named as co-conspirators (a so-called 
"co-conspirator exception").  We decline to recognize this exception where, as 
here, the alleged co-conspirators are not also joined as co-defendants. 
 
Link, 788 F.2d at 931 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 Similarly, in Brand Name, although the district court did allow the plaintiff 
retailers of pharmaceutical drugs to sue both the manufacturers and the wholesalers, it 
did so on the basis that the plaintiffs had alleged that the parties immediately upst
(i.e. the wholesalers) had colluded with the manufacturers to fix prices.  The plaintiffs 
had not alleged that overcharges were passed on but rather that the wholesalers, as part 
of a price-fixing conspiracy, had directly imposed an overcharge on the plaintiff 
retailers.  See Brand Name, 867 F. Supp. at 1344. 
 Most significantly, the district court in Brand Name emphasized that the reason it 
had not granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer-defendants was because "the 
plaintiffs ha[d] named [as defendants] a large percentage of all possible [wholesalers who 
had allegedly participated in the conspiracy]." Id. at 1346.  The district court declined 
to "penalize[] [the plaintiffs] for the failure to join every single [w]holesaler 
[involved in the alleged conspiracy] . . . ."  Id. 
 Plaintiffs here posit that they have joined all of the co-conspirators in the alleged 
conspiracy (i.e. the Hospital defendants and the Copy Service defendants).  Reasoning that 
they have thereby satisfied the requirements of the co-conspirator exception, plaintiffs 
argue that they should therefore be accorded standing to bring an antitrust claim even 
though they are not direct purchasers.  We cannot agree. 
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 Plaintiffs misconstrue Brand Name and Link, and misconceive the nature of the co
conspirator exception.  In order to fall within the exception, plaintiffs here would have 
to allege that the intermediaries immediately upstream, that is, the attorneys, colluded 
with the defendants to overcharge plaintiffs for the photocopies.  Moreover, plaintiffs 
would be obliged to join the lawyers as defendants, which they have not done.  In sum, the 
co-conspirator exception does not apply here. 
 
E. 
 Plaintiffs also suggest that the present case falls within the "pre-existing cost
plus contract" exception to the direct purchaser rule.  This exception arises from dictum 
in Hanover Shoe: 
We recognize that there might be situations--for instance, when an overcharged 
buyer has a pre-existing "cost-plus" contract, thus making it easy to prove that 
he has not been damaged--where the considerations requiring that the passing-on 
defense not be permitted in this case would not be present. 
Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494. 
 The vitality of the "pre-existing cost-plus contract" exception is doubtful, however, 
in light of Utilicorp.  The Supreme Court, in that case, expressly refused to recognize an 
exception to Illinois Brick even where one hundred percent of the cost increases had been 
passed through to indirect purchasers. Utilicorp, 497 U.S. at 216. 
 Moreover, even if this exception survived Utilicorp, plaintiffs have failed to show 
that they meet the prerequisites of this exception.  Specifically, plaintiffs have failed 
to show the existence of a pre-existing agreement to purchase a fixed quantity of 
photocopies from the attorneys.  See Mid-West Paper, 596 F.2d at 580.  In addition, as 
discussed earlier, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they must pay the full cost 
of the copies since their liability for litigation costs is only contingent in nature.
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 In sum, plaintiffs have failed to establish that any exception to the direct 
purchaser rule obtains.  Thus, we hold that plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their 
antitrust claim (count I). 
 
IV. 
 Significantly, antitrust standing principles apply equally to allegations of RICO 
violations.  See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 270 (1992).  The 
precepts taught by Illinois Brick and Utilicorp apply to RICO claims, thereby denying RICO 
standing to indirect victims.  Wooten v. Loshbough, 951 F.2d 768, 770 (7th Cir. 1991); 
County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 866 F.2d 839, 851 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied
U.S. 1003 (1990); Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1985); Terre Du Lac 
Ass'n v. Terre Du Lac, Inc., 772 F.2d 467, 473 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 
1082 (1986); Daley's Dump Truck Serv., Inc. v. Kiewit Pac. Co., 759 F. Supp. 1498, 1504 
(W.D. Wash. 1991), aff'd sub. nom., Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pac. Co., 976 F.2d 1303 
(9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1644 (1993).  Indeed, plaintiffs have conceded 
that, if they lacked antitrust standing, they also lacked RICO standing. See Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Secure Certification (Nov. 29, 1994), at 3-4 (App. at 1168-69). 
 Hence, the central and dispositive issue is whether plaintiffs are "direct 
purchasers."  If so, they are entitled to pursue both their antitrust and RICO claims.  If 
not, and insofar as damages are concerned, the district court properly granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants. 
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V. 
 Finally, plaintiffs argue that even if they lack standing to recover damages under 
section 4 of the Clayton Act,0 they may still seek injunctive relief under section 16 of 
the Act.0 
 Standing analysis under section 16 is not identical to that for section 4.  See
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111 n.6 (1986).  "Section 16 has 
been applied more expansively, both because its language is less restrictive than that of 
§ 4 . . . and because the injunctive remedy is a more flexible and adaptable tool for 
enforcing the antitrust laws than the damage remedy . . . ."  Schoenkopf v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 1980).  Most importantly, "because 
standing under § 16 raises no threat of multiple lawsuits or duplicative recoveries [i.e. 
the concerns voiced in Illinois Brick], some of the factors other than antitrust injury 
that are appropriate to a determination of standing under § 4 are not relevant under § 
16."  Cargill, 479 U.S. at 111 n.6. 
 In Mid-West Paper, we expressly rejected the contention that the direct purchaser 
rule bars injunctive relief under section 16 as well as a treble damages suit under 
section 4.  We explained that  
in contrast to the treble damage action, a claim for injunctive relief does not 
present the countervailing considerations--such as the risk of duplicative or 
ruinous recoveries and the spectre of a trial burdened with complex and 
                     
0Section 4 of the Clayton Act allows for recovery of treble damages in a private antitrust 
action: 
 
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of 
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall 
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including 
a reasonable attorney's fee. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 15(a). 
0Section 16 provides in relevant part: 
 
Any person . . . shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief . . . 
against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 26. 
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conjectural economic analyses--that the Supreme Court emphasized when limiting 
the availability of treble damages. 
 
Mid-West Paper, 596 F.2d at 590.  See also Merican, 713 F.2d at 962 n.6; In re Beef Indus. 
Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1167 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980).  
We cautioned that  
the rule of standing urged by the defendants, which would completely bar 
indirect purchasers from seeking injunctive relief, would leave a serious gap in 
the antitrust enforcement scheme, as the fate of these injured parties, and of 
the competitive economy in an entire industry, would be made dependent upon the 
willingness of the government and the direct purchasers to assume the burdens of 
a lengthy lawsuit. 
 
Mid-West Paper, 596 F.2d at 593-94. 
 Although plaintiffs need not satisfy Illinois Brick's "direct purchaser" require
in order to seek injunctive relief, they must still make a threshold showing of 
entitlement to injunctive relief.  That is, plaintiffs must show: (1) threatened loss or 
injury cognizable in equity; (2) proximately resulting from the alleged antitrust 
violation.  City of Rohnert Park v. Harris, 601 F.2d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); Central Nat'l Bank v. Rainbolt, 720 F.2d 1183, 1186 (10th 
Cir. 1983).  Because the district court never considered whether plaintiffs would be 
entitled to injunctive relief under section 16, separate and apart from the Illinois Brick
standing rule, we will remand to allow the district court to undertake such an analysis.
 
 VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants on plaintiffs' treble-damages claim (count I) and RICO 
claim (count II),0 but we will reverse as to plaintiffs' claim for  
                     
0Count III, the civil rights claim, was dismissed by the district court and is not on 
appeal before us. 
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injunctive relief and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.0
 
MARY RUTH MCCARTHY, ET AL. V. RECORDEX SERVICE, INC., ET AL. 
NO. 95-1005                                                 
STAPLETON, J., Concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
 
 As the court acknowledges, it is "beyond cavil that the attorney-client relationship 
is an agent-principal relationship." (Majority Op. at 25.)  Nevertheless, the court 
declares that the "attorneys [in this case], and not the clients, were undeniably the 
direct purchasers of the photocopies."  (Majority Op. at 24.) The first of these 
inconsistent propositions is clearly correct; it necessarily follows that the second is 
not.  Because the photocopies were purchased from the defendant copy services by the 
attorneys, as agents for their disclosed client-principals, it is the clients, and not th
attorneys, who purchased them. For this reason, I would reverse the judgment of the 
district court and remand for further proceedings on all of the plaintiffs' claims.
 
I. 
 In part III-B, the court concludes that: (1) the Supreme Court in Associated Gene
Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 
(1983) [hereinafter AGC], neither overruled Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 
(1977), nor limited its application; (2) "AGC incorporates, rather than repudiates, the 
                     
0Although the injunctive relief issue was only perfunctorily briefed and discussed, we 
seriously question whether the issue can be successfully pursued.  We note, for instance, 
that plaintiffs apparently have obtained all of the medical records relevant to their 
particular personal injury claims, and there is little, if any, likelihood that plaintiffs 
will request additional copies of those records from the defendants. Moreover, it is 
highly doubtful that additional hospital records pertaining to plaintiffs' personal injury 
claims will be generated.  Nevertheless, because our precedents require that a claim for 
an injunction under section 16 be treated differently than a claim for treble damages 
under section 4, it is appropriate that the district court, rather than this Court, 
consider the merits of the claim for injunctive relief in the first instance. 
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principles of Illinois Brick," (Majority Op. at 19;) (3) AGC and Illinois Brick address 
two distinct aspects of antitrust standing; and (4) in order to escape summary judgment, 
the plaintiffs must establish that they and not their attorneys are the direct purchasers 
of the photocopies.  I agree. 
 Whether the plaintiffs are direct purchasers of the copies, however, depends on 
whether the attorneys are agents for the plaintiffs with respect to the purchase of the 
copies.  If the attorneys bought the copies as agents for the plaintiffs, then the 
plaintiffs are the direct purchasers of the copies.  If, on the other hand, the attorneys 
purchased the copies on their own behalves, then the plaintiffs are indirect purchasers of 
the copies.  When the applicable law is applied to the facts reflected in the summary 
judgment record, the conclusion is inescapable that the attorneys purchased the copies for 
their clients and that the clients are the direct purchasers. 
A. 
 In Pennsylvania, the elements of agency are "the manifestation by the principal that 
the agent shall act for him, the agent's acceptance of the undertaking and the 
understanding of the parties that the principal is to be in control of the undertaking."  
Scott v. Purcell, 415 A.2d 56, 60 (Pa. 1980) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency
Comment b (1958)). When a lawyer undertakes to represent a client, he consents to the 
client's having control of the representation even though he may be expected to exercise 
professional judgment with respect to the means of pursuing the objectives of the 
representation. Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2(a).  For this reason, the 
attorney-client relationship, as the court acknowledges, is generally regarded as an 
agency relationship. As a principal, the client is bound by the actions of the attorney in 
the course of the representation.  As an agent, the attorney, like other agents, is a 
fiduciary and owes to his client-principal a duty of care, obedience, and loyalty. 
Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 377-398; e.g., Pennsylvania Rules of Professional 
Conduct 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.15.  In particular, an attorney who obtains tangible property in 
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the course of carrying out the agency owes to his client-principal a duty to exercise 
reasonable care in its protection, to use it only in accordance with the directions of the 
principal and for his benefit, and to surrender it upon demand on the termination of the 
agency.  Id. § 422; Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct 1.15, 1.16(d).  While the 
attorney may have a lien to secure any unpaid compensation, it is only a lien and any 
tangible property obtained or created in the course of the representation belongs to the 
client-principal.  Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct 1.16(d). 
 The record here reflects typical attorney-client relationships between the plaintiffs 
and their attorneys.  The attorneys agreed to represent the plaintiffs in their personal 
injury suits and thus to obtain on their behalf the goods and services necessary to 
prosecute those suits.0  Although the attorneys, as permitted by Pennsylvania's Rules of 
Professional Conduct,0 are advancing to their clients the expenses associated with 
litigating their cases, this does not, in my view, alter the relationship between the 
attorneys and their clients or between the clients and third parties with whom the 
attorneys deal on the clients' behalf.  By contrast, nothing in the record suggests that 
the attorneys are purchasing the records on their own behalves in the hope of making a 
profit on resales to their clients. 
 The attorneys' role as agent is controlling here because, unless otherwise agreed, an 
agent for a disclosed principal is not a party to a contract that the agent enters on 
                     
0
  Of course, it is understood that an attorney obtains goods used generally in his 
practice, such as office supplies, on his own behalf.  Office supplies are analogous to 
the paint purchased by a housepainter or the gasoline purchased by a taxicab driver in the 
court's hypotheticals.  (See Majority Op. at 22 n.15; 24 n.17.) 
0
  Pennsylvania's Rules of Professional Conduct 1.8(e) provides: 
 
 (e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in 
connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that: 
 
 (1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the 
repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and 
 
 (2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and 
expenses of litigation on behalf of the client. 
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behalf of the principal.  Restatement (Second) of Agency § 320 (followed in Revere Press, 
Inc. v. Blumberg, 246 A.2d 407, 409 (Pa. 1968)). Thus, unless it is agreed that such an 
agent is to be a party to a contract, the contract is, in effect, a contract between the 
principal and the third party.  Restatement (Second) of Agency §292 (followed in Hillbrook 
Apartments, Inc. v. NYCE Crete Co., 352 A.2d 148, 154 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975)).  
Accordingly, where, as here, an attorney purchases photocopies of records and it is 
understood by the seller that they are being purchased on behalf of his client, the client 
and not the attorney is the purchaser. My review of Pennsylvania case law convinces me 
that Pennsylvania subscribes to these basic principles of agency in the context of the 
attorney-client relationship. 
 In Moore v. Porter, 13 Serg. & R. 100 (Pa. 1825), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
addressed the remedies available to a prothonotary to collect fees incurred by litigants.  
The court held that "[t]he party for whom the services are done, is responsible for the 
fees, and to him is the [prothonotary] to look. . . .  The fees are not chargeable to the 
attorney of the party for whom the services are done, unless he has become security for 
the costs."  Id. at 101. 
 Pessano v. Eyre, 13 Pa. Super. 157 (1900), involved a suit by an expert witness 
against the attorney that hired him in pursuit of his client's claim.  The superior court 
held that "[i]f . . . there was no express direct undertaking on the part of the 
[attorney] to pay what was due to the [expert witness], that is the end of the matter," 
because the expert witness could not collect from the attorney.  Id. at 163.  The attorney 
would be liable to the expert witness only if the attorney "ma[de] himself liable by a 
special promise."  Id.0 
                     
0
  The court concludes that in Pessano v. Eyre, 13 Pa. Super. 157 (1900), the superior 
court "had difficulty with this issue." (Majority Op. at 27 n.18.)  I am not sure of which 
difficulty the court speaks.  On the contrary, the superior court in Pessano plainly 
articulates the principle that while an agent is not generally liable on a contract made 
on behalf of a disclosed principal, "even where the agency is known, an agent . . . may 
render himself liable by an express undertaking."  Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Gallagher
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 In Messenger Publishing Co. v. Walkinshaw, 157 A. 18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1931), the 
superior court held that where an attorney orders copies of "a paper book used on appeal" 
from a publishing company, the attorney does so in his capacity as an agent for his 
client.  As the court explained: 
When an attorney has been acting for the defendant up to judgment and the client acts 
with him in the taking of an appeal and the attorney orders the printing of the 
paper-books required by the rules of the appellate court, it is to be presumed that
he is acting under authority from his client.  At least, the ordering of the paper
books is within the scope of the attorney's authority. 
Id. at 19 (quoting Huntzinger v. Devlin, 80 Pa. Super. Ct. 187 (1922)).  Thus, the 
publishing company, the court held, could not collect from the attorney.   
 Based on Moore, Pessano, Walkinshaw, and Huntzinger, I conclude that in Pennsylvania, 
"when an attorney contracts with a third party for the benefit of a client for goods or 
services to be used in connection with the attorney's representation of a particular 
client and the third party is aware of these facts, the attorney is not liable on the 
contract unless he either expressly or impliedly assumes some type of special liability." 
Eppler, Guerin & Turner, Inc. v. Kasmir, 685 S.W.2d 737, 738 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).0
Numerous jurisdictions agree.  See Christensen, O'Connor, Garrison & Havelka v. State of 
Washington, Department of Revenue, 649 P.2d 839, 843 (Wash. 1982); Hasbrouck v. Krsul
P.2d 1197, 1198 (Mont. 1975); In re May, 261 N.E.2d 109, 110 (N.Y. 1970); Kates v. 
Millheiser, 569 So.2d 1357, 1357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Free v. Wilmar J. Helric Co.
688 P.2d 117, 119-20 (Or. Ct. App. 1984); Weeden Engineering Corp. v. Hale, 435 So.2d 
                                                                                          
A.2d 401, 402 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1953).  In the record in this case, there is no evidence 
an express undertaking of liability by the attorneys.  Moreover, the fact that the 
attorney may commit himself to be responsible to the seller for the purchase price does 
not mean that the client is not also responsible or that any property purchased in the 
sale on behalf of the client does not belong to the client. 
 
0
  The court intimates that Pennsylvania case law may be inapposite because no 
Pennsylvania case discusses the agency issue in a federal antitrust context and none 
address the direct purchaser rule.  (See Majority Op. at 27 n.18.)  In my view, this 
distinction is not significant because the agency status of the attorneys is purely a 
question of state law.  The court does not suggest a reason why the agency question may 
turn out differently in the federal antitrust context, and I perceive none. 
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1158, 1160 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Petrando v. Barry, 124 N.E.2d 85, 87 (Ill. Ct. App. 1955); 
7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 140 (1980) ("In the absence of assumption of personal 
liability, an attorney is generally not liable for work done by third persons in 
connection with his representation of a client.").   
 Under this case law, the plaintiff-clients, and not their attorneys, are responsible 
for the purchase price of the photocopies.  Moreover, the record reflects that they have 
had to pay in the past0 and will continue to have to pay in the future0 the prices that the 
copy services choose to charge. Assuming that an antitrust violation has affected the 
prices that the copy services charge, I fail to understand how there could be a more 
direct causal relationship between that violation and the plaintiffs' alleged injuries.
 
B. 
 The court concludes that because the attorneys are independent contractors with 
respect to the purchase of the copies, the attorneys, rather than the plaintiffs, are the 
direct purchasers of the copies.  The issue of whether the attorneys are independent 
contractors is simply not relevant here, however. Independent contractor status is 
relevant only to determine the extent of a principal's tort liability to third parties. 
According to the law of respondeat superior, where B acts for the benefit of A and commits 
a tort and injures C, if B is an independent contractor, then C cannot recover from A 
regardless of whether B is A's agent.  If, on the other hand, B is a servant of A, then C 
can recover from A regardless of whether B is A's agent.  Thus, even if it be true that 
the plaintiffs' attorneys are independent contractors, all this tells us is that the 
plaintiffs are not responsible to third parties for torts committed by the attorneys.  It 
                     
0
  As the court acknowledges in footnote 6, plaintiffs Thomasetti and Hoffman have covered 
their attorneys' advances. 
0
  Even if one credits the testimony that F&S chooses not to press its contract right
reimbursement in unsuccessful cases, it is clear that the clients will wind up paying the 
purchase price of the photocopies in all successful cases. 
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tells us nothing about whether the attorneys, as their agents, purchased the copies on 
their behalves.  See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 2, 219-220. 
 
II. 
 Because antitrust standing principles apply equally to allegations of RICO 
violations, I would conclude, for the foregoing reasons, that the plaintiffs may go 
forward on their RICO damage claims.  Because I agree with the court that the plaintiffs 
have standing to prosecute their claim for injunctive relief under Section 16 of the 
Clayton Act, I would remand for further proceedings on all of plaintiffs' claims. 
